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SURVIVING FICTIONS II"
JEREMIAH SMITH
Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University.
EXAMPLI, Six: As to the alleged presumption that everyone knows
the law.
"Everyone is presumed to know the law."
This, on its face, is a rule of evidence.
"Ignorance of law excuses no one" (for breaking the law); or,
more fully, ignorance of law affords no excuse for crime, breach of
contract, or tort.
This is a rule of substantive law whose precise limits or application
need not now be considered.
The alleged presumption is sometimes treated (spoken of) as if
it were either
(1) identical with the rule of substantive law (a paraphrase or
free translation of the rule); or
(2) as giving us a correct reason for the rule of substantive law.
Neither view is correct.
As to the first view.
It has been said:
"The presumption is a rhetorical paraphrase for the state-
ment that ignorance of law is no defense to legal liability."107
"Often these maxims and ground principles get expressed
in this form of a presumption perversely and inaccurately, as
when the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one, is put
in the form that everyone is presumed to know the law. ... "100
"When we say that men are conclusively presumed to know
the Criminal Law, we mean that men are to be punished for
certain acts without regard to whether they know them to
be against the law or not."10 9
As to the second view-that the alleged presumption gives the
correct reason for the rule of substantive law.
This again is erroneous, though more plausible than the first view.
To this second view there are two answers:
(a) There is no such presumption.
(b) There is another, and a sufficient, reason for the rule of sub-
stantive law.
* Continued from the March, 1918, issue-Vol. II St. Louis Law Rev. 214.
107 Best, Ev4d, (3d Am. ed. by Chamberlayne) 310 b.1o Thayer, Prel. Treatise on Enid. 335.109 Gray, Nature and .Sources of the Law, s. 228.
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(a) There is no such presumption. It is not well founded on
fact. It is a fiction.110
"There is a rule of law that in certain cases ignorance of
law excuses no one; but there is no presumption that everyone
knows the law.""'
"If this presumption can be taken to mean that most per-
sons know the law, it is on its face absurd.- 2
That any actual system of law is knowable by those who are
bound to obey it
"is so notoriously and ridiculously false that I shall not occupy
your time with proof to the contrary."113
"There is no presumption in this country that every person
knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and
reason if it were so,,n
"Now to affirm 'that every person may know the law,' iN
to affirm the thing which is not. And to say 'that his ignorance
should not excuse him because he is bound to know," is simply
to assign the rule as a reason for itself."'-' 5
"Its identity with the recognized maxim ignorantia juris
non excusat being disproved, the proposition that a man is pre-
sumed to know the law is proved to be of decidedly questionable
character.'-'
"As regards knowledge of law the rule is that ignorance of
the law is no excuse for breaking it, a doctrine which is some-
times stated under the form of a maxim that everyone is con-
clusively presumed to know the law-a statement which to my
mind resembles a forged release to a forged bond."" 7
(b) There is another, and a sufficient, reason for the rule of sub-
stantive law, and there is no need to resort to the fiction of a presump-
tion of knowledge.
The rule is an arbitrary one, founded not in mere expediency, but
on necessity.118 The real reason is fully stated by Austin in substance
as follows: If ignorance of law were admitted as a ground of exemp-
tion, the court would be compelled to enter upon interminable ques-
tions of fact. They would have to try not only the question whether
the party was ignorant of the law, but also whether his ignorance was
110 It might not be unreasonable to presume that most men know that theft is
a crime, but the alleged presumption, as usually stated is not limited to the most
common instances of unlawfulness.
III Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 87.
112 Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law (1908) 22
Harv. L. Rev. 91.
Is I Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 497.114 Maule, J., Martindale v. Falkner (1846) 2 C. B. 706, 719. See also Lord
Mansfield, Jones v. Randall (1774) Cowp. 37, 40; Abbott, C. J., Montriou v.
Jeffervs (1825) 2 Car. & P., 113, 116.1251 Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 498.
116 Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, s. 36.
1"T2 Stephen, Hist. of Crim. Law of Eng. 114.)is I Bishop, New Crim. Law, s. 294 1.
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inevitable, whether he might have known the law if he had tried to
know it. And for the purpose of determining whether he was to blame
for his ignorance,
"it were incumbent upon the tribunal to unravel his previous
history, and to search his whole life for the elements of a just
solution.""".
By the great weight of judicial decision, money paid under a mis-
take of law cannot be recovered back; in an early leading case the
reason given was: "Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the
law." Two recent writers have strenuously contended that the deci-
sions denying recovery are erroneous; the rule ignorantia juris non
excusat applying only to cases of delinquency.2 0 Into the discussion
of this question we do not enter. For present purposes it is enough to
say that if the alleged presumption as to knowledge of law is not recog-
nized in cases of delinquency, there is no good ground for recognizing
it in cases of money paid under mistake.
ExAImPL Srxv,: Constructive Fraud.12
"Looking to the common sense of the question, it seems
that constructive fraud is, or was, so called just because it was
not actual fraud."'2
It is used only "in an artificial sense of the word." Fraud, actual fraud,
involves the element of moral delinquency, such as conscious dishon-
esty, or conscious disregard of truth.
How came the term "constructive fraud" to be used? Is there
any good reason for continuing to use it?
Equity originally was a system intended to allow parties relief
which could not be obtained under the stiff and unbending rules and
procedure of the common law. It involved a more elastic procedure
and new rights. But in time, equity itself began to harden into a rigid
system. There was a tendency to refuse to entertain a case unless the
particular case could be brought under some already recognized head
of equity jurisdiction. Fraud was one of those heads. Hence, in
1191 Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 498-499. See also reason stated in Holmes,
Common Law, 48. The difficulty of investigation is not rated so high in Holmes,
nor in one passage in Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 460; but in an earlier passage
on p. 458-9, Salmond seems to agree substantially with Austin.120 Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 85-90; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, ss. 35-37.
= "Among the regular though not invariable marks of fictions in modern
English law is the use of the word 'constructive' or the word 'implied,' as.any
careful student may note for himself." Sir F. Pollock, Notes on Maine's
'Ancient Law' (1905) 21 Law Quart. Rev. 165, 173. See the same learned writer
as to constructive notice, constructive possession, and constructive delivery, in
31 Law Quart Rev. 94.22 Sir F. Pollock, Nocton v. Lord Ashburton (1915) 31 Law QuarL Rev.
93-94.
Washington University Open Scholarship
SURVIVING FICTIONS.
cases where there was no actual fraud, but where justice required the
granting of relief, there was an attempt to discover some analogy or
resemblance to fraud which might plausibly justify the court in apply-
ing the epithet "constructive" fraud and in regarding the case as falling
under the general head of fraud. The result was that "constructive
fraud" became a prominent title in equity, occupying a large space in
Judge Story's work on Equity Jurisprudence, covering more than 160
pages in the first edition of that work, published in 1835.L" Jurisdiction
was taken as to certain classes of persons, or upon certain states of
fact, where there was no actual dishonesty, but which were classed
under the general head of constructive fraud.
Judge Story, at the beginning of his long chapter on Constructive
Fraud, has sometimes been regarded as almost apologizing for doc-
trines which (as he says) "may seem to be of an artificial, if not of an
arbitrary, character." 1 4 But Mr. Bower has recently said that the
apology should have been made.
"not for the doctrines, which are admirable, but for the nomen-
clature, which is vile. . . . The 'arbitrariness' is in
describing these acts by a name in popular use to which they
do not answer . . . instead of simply laying down that
certain acts and omissions are prohibited, irrespective of fraud
or honesty, on the ground of the tendency and temptation to
evil which would otherwise result.''
At the present time, however, there is no longer any need to resort
to subterfuges or to employ fiction phraseology. "At this day we
have learnt a bolder and simpler method."'" Courts of equity as well
as courts of law do not now hesitate to declare distinctly that certain
duties are incumbent upon specific classes of persons, or in certain
situations of fact. And they hold persons liable for violations of these
duties utterly irrespective of dishonesty or of conscious wrong doing.
Liability is imposed where there is no tinge of actual fraud nor any
ground for applying the epithet of constructive fraud.
The modern method of dealing with cases which might formerly
have been classed under "constructive fraud" is illustrated by the
recent decision of the House of Lords in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton.-
In that case a solicitor advised his client to release part of a mortgage
13 
"Some of you may remember the terribly multifarious contents of the
heading 'Constructive Fraud' in the old-fashioned books on equity. Logically,
nothing could be less defensible than such a catalogue, or more bewildering to
youngstudents." Pollock, Expansion of the Law, 115.I221 Story, Eq. Jurisp. (1st ed.) sec. 258.
Is Bower Actionable Misrepresentation, App. s. 455, p. 387.
In Potloci, Law of Fraud in British India, 15, 16, 41, 42.
I" L L [19141 Apo. Cas. 932. See 40 Law Mag. & Rev. (5th Ser., 1915)
223-226.
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security in which the solicitor himself was interested. The result of
following this advice was that the security became insufficient and
part of the mortgage money was lost. The client sued the solicitor
in the Chancery Division to recover for the loss. Fraud was promi-
nently averred as a ground for relief. Upon a hearing, it appeared
that the solicitor had negligently failed to ascertain the truth of the
representations which he made to his client. The judge of first instance,
Neville, J., while holding that the solicitor stated what was not true
in fact, and in advising as he did fell far short of his duty as solicitor,
nevertheless found there was no actual fraud proved, and dismissed
the action. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the ground
that actual fraud was proved. The House of Lords held that the Court
of Appeal was not justified in reversing the finding of fact by Neville,
J- as to there being no actual fraud. But they decided in favor of
plaintiff upon the ground (1) that there was a duty upon the solicitor,
arising from the fiduciary relation, to use care in ascertaining and
imparting information; (2) that there had been a breach of this duty;
and (3) that the breach of this duty gave the client a right to relief
without proving conscious dishonesty, or conscious disregard of truth,
or actual fraud of any kind, on the part of the solicitor. They distin-
guished Derry v. Peek128 on the ground that that was "an action wholly
and solely of deceit, founded wholly and solely on fraud;" and that
deceit being "a necessary factor, actual dishonesty, involving mens rea,
must be proved." They say that the decision in Derry v. Peek "has
no bearing whatever on actions founded on a breach of duty in which
dishonesty is not a necessary fact."'' -
Sir F. Pollock, in commenting on ANocton v. Lord Ashburton, con-
curs in the view that this case is not affected by the deciion in Derry
v. Peek :
"and this is not the less so because the breach of these special
fiduciary duties was called 'constructive fraud' in the days when
equity practitioners used the word Fraud as nomen generalis-
simum."
He also says that
"a rule of law making wilful falsehood or at least conscious
disregard of truth a necessary element in actual fraud is not,
on the face of it, applicable to the various breaches of duty
M (1889) L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337.
129 Lord Shaw, p. 970: Lord Parmoor, p. 978. As to alleged inconsistencies
in the law now applied to misrepresentation in its various aspects, see the valu-
able article by Prof. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911)
24 Harv. L. Rev. 415-440:
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which for historical reasons have been gathered under the
catchword of 'constructive fraud.' "13O
There is no more justification for using the term "constructive
fraud" in courts of law than in courts of equity.
In both courts there has been a tendency to confuse negligence
and fraud.
"Negligence and fraud are in truth mutually exclusive con-
ceptions; although the same facts may (sometimes) be evidence
either of one or of the other."131
But it is a mistake to assume that evidence which proves negli-
gence must necessarily prove fraud. It is an error to treat
"facts which on no reasonable interpretation could be evidence
of more than negligence as in themselves evidence of fraud."' 32
It is an error to say that gross negligence "implies fraud,"'- or that
gross negligence is fraud.
The objections to the term "constructive fraud" (including the
confusion resulting from its use) have been strongly stated by authori-
ties entitled to great respect.1 34 The reasonable conclusion is that the
term should be dropped from the law.13
EXAMPLE EIGHT: Constructive Trust.
In the cases generally described by the term "constructive trust,"
that expression is confessedly a fiction phrase.136 The so-called con-
structive trusts recognized and enforced by chancery "are neither
express trusts nor resulting trusts."'1 7 Cases classed under this head
are largely, if not wholly, cases where a defendant has wrongfully
acquired possession of, or legal title to, property in violation of the
rights of the beneficial owner, generally by fraud, actual or "construc-
tive." ' s A court of equity in order to give the sufferer an efficacious
remedy permits him to employ the same "machinery" applied by such
1so 31 Law Quart. Rev. 93, 94. Compare Lord Dunedin, L. R. (1914) App.
Cas. 963, and Lord Haldane, 953.131 Ashburmer, Equity, 87.
13 See Ashburner, Eqity 88.
mSee I Story, Eq. urs. (8th ed.) s. 391.
114 See, for example, Lord Romilly, M. R., In re Agriculturists' Cattle Ins.
Co, (1867) L. R. 3 Eq. 769, 771-772; and Mr. Ewart in his work on Estoppel,
160, 23, 286, 259-261, 87, 98.
12" The high authority of Mr. Pomeroy is opposed to this conclusion, al-
though that very able writer recognizes the objections to the term. See 2 Pome-roy, Eq. Jurisp. (ed. 1881-1882) s. 874, n. 2; and see also s. 922.
See 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) s. 166, p. 262; Prof. Pound, The Decadence
of Equity (1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 20, 29.See Professor Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Result-
ing, apd Constructive (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 448.
18 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jursip. s. 155; 2 ibid. s. 1044; 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.)
s. 166, p. 259.
As to constructive trusts in cases other than those of fraud; see Bispham,
Principles of Equity (9th ed.) s. 91, p. 168 et seq.; Adams, Equity (8th ed.)
p. 36, m. 2.
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courts to cases of violation of express trusts. But there is no "trust"
in any proper sense of that term.139 There is no fiduciary relation; no
relation created in pursuance of the intent of the parties; no trust
or confidence reposed by the beneficial owner in the so-called trustee.140
As to the meaning of the expression "constructive trust" when
used in such connection, and as to the reason for so using it, there
is a very clear statement by Lord Westbury in Rolfe v. Gregory41
which may be regarded as a representative case. In that case, there
had been a fraudulent abstraction of trust property by the trustee and
a fraudulent receipt and appropriation of it by another party (the
defendant Gregory) for his own personal benefit. The defense was
set up that the plaintiff beneficiary had lost his remedy by lapse of time,
it being contended that Gregory's liability "was to be considered as
resulting merely from constructive trust." Lord Chancellor Westbury
said142 that this view
"involves a misapprehension of the true principles on which
the action of this Court is founded. The relief is founded on
fraud and not on constructive trust. When it is said that the
person who fraudulently receives or possesses himself of trust
property is converted by this Court into a trustee, the expression
is used for the purpose of describing the nature and extent of
the remedy against him, and it denotes that the parties entitled
beneficially have the same rights and remedies against him as
they would be entitled to as against an express trustee who had
fraudulently committed a breach of trust."
So Professor Scott says of "constructive trust":
"It is the name given to the remedy, not the right for which
the remedy is given. There is as good reason in the case of a
non-fiduciary as in the case of a fiduciary for imposing a duty
to surrender property acquired by a wrongful act; it should
make no difference whether it is acquired by breach of trust
or other fiduciary obligation, or by fraud or theft." 43
139 See 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. s. 1044, 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) p. 262.
140 See Professor Scott (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 126, n. 4. Professor Cos-
tigan, op. cit. 27 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 439, n. 6.141 (1865) 4 De G. J. & S. 576.
142 Ibid. 579.
143 The Right to Follow Money Wrongly Mingled with Other Money (1913)
27 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 126, n. 4. Mr. Bispham says:
T.quity . . . makes use of the machinery of a trust for the purpose of
affording redress in case of fraud . . . But in such cases, the interference of
courts of equity is called into play by fraud as a distinct head of jurisdiction;
and the complainant's right to relief is based upon that ground, the defendant
being treated as a trustee merely for the purpose of working out the equity of the
complainant." Bispham, Principles of Equity (9th ed.) s. 91, p. 168.
The cases of fraud do not fall within any generally a pproved definition of
the term "resulting trust." Hence, we do not here consider whether resulting
trusts should be classed, as by Maitland, under the head of trusts created by act
of the law, or, as by Costigan, under the head of trusts created by act of a party.
See Professor Costigan, op. cit. 27 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 461, 462.
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What phrase should be substituted for "constructive trust" in
order to indicate the cases heretofore improperly described by that
term? Answer: cases of tortious misappropriation of property for
which there is a remedy in equity as well as at law.
ExAxmpL NINX: As to Fiction Contracts.
Under this head must be classed a very large number of cases
which, under the old forms of action, were enforced in an action of
contract, but in which there was no contract whatever, the promise
alleged in the declaration being an absolute fiction.
These cases are generally described as implied contracts or quasi-
contracts. There are objections to both terms.
"Implied contract" is an ambiguous term. It may be understood
as denoting either a contract implied in fact or a contract implied in
law. The former is a genuine contract, the latter is a fiction contract.
A genuine contract includes two varieties. It may be what is
called an express contract, i. e., where the consent of the parties is
"expressly stated in words spoken or written." Or it may be a con-
tract "implied in fact" (sometimes described as "a tacit contraqt"),
i. e., a contract inferred as a fact from the conduct of the parties (some
sort of conduct other than the use of words).'" Each of these varieties
is a true contract. They differ only in "the character of the evidence"
by which the existence of the contract is proved. "The source of the
obligation in each case is the intention of the parties."
"The term 'contract implied in law' is used, however, to
denote, not the nature of the evidence by which the claim of the
plaintiff is to be established, but the source of the obligation
itself. It is a term used to cover a class of obligations where
the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume an obli-
gation, imposes an obligation upon him, notwithstanding the
absence of intention on his part, and in many cases in spite of
his actual dissent."'
A contract implied, or created, by law "is no contract at all.
Neither mutual assent nor consideration is essential to its validity. It
is enforced regardless' of the intention of the obligor."146
The term quasi-contract is unsatisfactory to many jurists.42 It
"suggests a relation and an analogy between contract and quasi-
contract. The relation is distant and the analogy slight. The
differences are greater than the similarities."148
14See Terry, Leading Princyi*k of Anglo-American Low, s. 48&14 Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 5.
IN Professor J. B. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 160.
14 7 See Sir F. Pollock, Notes on Maine's "Ancient Law" (1906), 22 Law
Quart. Rev. 89; 1 Halsbury (2d ed.) Introd. 11. Professor Knowlton, The
Quaai-Contractual Obligations of Municipal Corporations (1911) 9 Mich. L.Rev. 671.
148Professor Corbin, Quasi-Coxtractural Obligations (1912) 21 Yale Law
Journal, W3, 544.
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A happier designation "would be one that avoided altogether the use
of the word 'contract.' 1149
The term quasi-contract, used in a very broad sense, applies "to
all non-contractual obligations which are treated, for the purpose of
affording a remedy, as if they were contracts."'1w° In Anson on Con-
tracts (12th ed.) 8, it is said:
"This is a convenient term for a multifarious class of legal
relations which possess this common feature, that without agree-
ment, and without delict or breach of duty on either side, A has
been compelled to pay or provide something for which X ought
to have paid or made provision, or X has received something
which A ought to receive. The law in such cases imposes a
duty upon X to make good to B the advantage to which A is
entitled."
The scope of Woodward on Quasi-Contracts is confined solely to
"obligations arising upon the receipt of a benefit, the retention of which
is unjust."'5 l
In-the two treatises which have been published on the special sub-
ject of quasi-contract, the learned authors, Keener and Woodward,
both affirm that, in all the cases grouped under this head, there is no
genuine agreement or assent; and that the "contract" heretofore alleged
in the declaration is a pure fiction.1'12
Why was the fiction of a contract employed by the courts in this
class of cases? "The answer to this question is to be sought, not in
the substantive law, but in the law of remedies."153 In modern times,
until the very recent changes in the law as to forms of actibn, it was
commonly assumed that (apart from suits to obtain possession of
specific articles of property) there were only two great divisions of
causes of personal action, contract and tort; and that there could be
no cause of personal action unless it could be classed under one or
the other of these two heads'5 4 Hence the court, in order to allow a
remedy upon what was really a non-contractual obligation, used the
149 See Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, s. 4. As to reasons for retaining the
term quasi-contract now that it is in such general use, and as to the difficulty of
finding a completely satisfactory substitute, see Professor Corbin, op. cit., 21
Yale Law Journal, 533, 545, 553. Pollock and Knowlton prefer the term con-
structive contract to quasi-contract. See also Lowrie, J., in Herizog v. Hertrog(1857) 29 Pa. 465.
15)Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, s. 1.
15 Woodward, s. 1. As to topics which might be included under quasi-
contract, see Woodward, s. 1; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 16-25. Cf. Corbin,
op. cit.
162 See Woodward, s. 4; Keener, pp. 5, 6; Maine, Ancient Law (3d Am. ed.)
332; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 160; Judge Francis J. Swayze, The Grow-
ing Law (1915) 25 Yale Law Journal, 1, 4.
'15 Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 14.
54 See citations in Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Clas-
sification (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 242-243.
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fiction of a contract (alleged a fictitious contract) .'5 Incidentally, it
may be noted that this resort to fiction sometimes relieved the court
from giving reasons for the existence of an obligation (from inquiring
carefully into reasons for imposing absolute liability).
"It is easier for the courts to say that a man is bound to
pay because he must be taken to have so promised, than to lay
down for the first time the principle that he is bound to pay
whether he has promised or not."'165
"I think that there is at present, wherever the old forms
of action have been abolished and pleadings are required to
contain simply a statement of the actual facts, . . . no
sufficient reason for persisting in the use of this fiction, but that
it is for many reasons desirable to admit the existence of non-
contractual obligations much more freely than we now do
: I . and to confine the doctrine of contracts strictly within
its legitimate bounds instead of suffering it to overspread nearly
the whole area of the law of obligations."
(The author then says that he shall discard the fiction, and shall
describe "the obligations commonly said to arise from quasi-contracts
as non-contractual obligations.") 157
"It seems clear that a rational system of law is free to get
rid of the conception of quasi contractual obligation altogether.
No useful purpose is served by it at the present day.'158.
In the cases just mentioned, there was no contract whatever
between the parties; and the contract invented for the sake of the
remedy was an entire fiction. But there are cases where there is a
contract between the parties as to certain terms, and where the court
adds other terms which were not subjects of agreement. In the latter
instances
"the law adds terms to an actual contract independently of the
will of the parties or puts an arbitrary construction upon partic-
ular words. In such cases the contract may be partly expressed
or implied in fact, and partly implied in law."'1
'5 See Salmond, Iurisp. (ed. 1902) 563; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 14, 15.160 Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 564.
1STTerry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, s. 483.
"In an arrangement of the law the notion of an implied contract, so far as
that means a purely fictitious contract, and of a quasi-contract, should be dropped,
and non-contractual obligations be frankly recognized as such." Professor H.
T. Terry, 17 Col. L. Rev. (May, 1917) 3781E Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902). 564. And see Keener, Quasi-Contracts,
160, 172.16 Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, s. 485: "Implied
Contracts of a Mixed Nature.'" Compare W. G. Miller, Lectures on the Philbso-
phy of Law, 213.
See Terry, s. 488:
"That the implied terms which the law sometimes inserts in true contracts
.. although they are inserted without the actual consent of the parties, are
not inserted against their manifested wilL"
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss1/2
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Judges do not often avowedly add to a contract terms which
were never agreed to by the parties. Rather, they profess to be ascer-
taining (interpreting) the meaning of the language actually used by
the parties. But sometimes they are, in reality, guessing as to what the
parties would have agreed to upon a certain point in case that point
had been present to their minds (as it was not).1 0
Assuming that the court has power to add terms to a contract,
how shall such addition be designated? Shall the court, invoking the
aid of fiction, describe them as contracts (contracts implied in fact) ?
Or shall the court speak of them as absolute obligations imposed by
law? As to this there is a difference of opinion.
Professor Terry says :'6
"In drawing the line here between contractual and non-
contractual obligations, it seems to me that such implied terms
cannot be separated from the contract, and that where there
is an actual contract all the obligations resulting must be
regarded as contract obligations even though they take their
form from terms in the contract arbitrarily inserted by the law
and not actually agreed to by the parties."
Professor Williston, however, says :112
"But when a seller is held liable on a warranty for making
an affirmation of fact in regard to goods in order to induce
their purchase, to hold that such an affirmation is a contract is
to speak the language of pure fiction. . . . In truth, the
obligation imposed upon the seller in such a case is imposed
upon him not by virtue of his agreement to assume it, but
because of a rule of law applied irrespective of agreement."'11t
Thus far we have been discussing examples of surviving fictions.
But we wish now to consider briefly a discarded fiction whose history
will repay examination. This is:
The fiction of presuming a lost grant in order to establish an
easement in case of twenty years user.
It can hardly be said that this is a surziving fiction. The courts
are now discarding the fiction presumption; and are substituting for
it a positive rule of substantive law; "a rule of the law of property,
to be applied absolutely." But it is interesting to consider briefly the
origin, growth and final disuse of the fiction; and the adoption of a
positive rule of law not based on the presumption, but giving prac-
tically the same results.
169 See Professor Gray as to the judicial interpretation of statutes and wills,
Nature and Sources of the Law, ss. 370, 702, 703.161 Op. cit. s. 485.
162 Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 Harv. L. Re. 420.
1 6 3 As to Implied Warranty, see 2 Mechem, Sales, s. 1295; Professor Cos-
tigan, Change of Position as a Defense in Quasi-Contracts (1907) 20 Harv. L.
Rev. 205, 207.
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"The fiction of presuming a grant from twenty years'
possession was invented by the English courts in the eighteenth
century, to avoid the absurdities of their rule of legal mem-
ory."IP20
"The doctrine was originally adopted for the purpose of
quieting titles, and giving effect to long-continued possession."'' 5
At first, the presumption was not a conclusive one. Juries were
allowed to find the existence of a lost grant ("were told that they
might presume a lost grant") but the presumption could be rebutted.10
"In truth it was nothing but a canon of evidence . ..
This presumption of a lost grant or covenant was nothing more
than a rebuttable presumption of fact. . . . It must at the
same time be conceded that the courts exhibited a disinclination
to treat the presumption as an ordinary one. They preferred
to leave it in a logical cloud, and juries were encouraged, for
the sake of quieting possession, to infer the existence of deeds
in whose existence nobody did believe." 117
Subsequently, juries were told that they not only might, but were
bound to, presume the existence of such a lost grant."" They were
not merely advised, but directed, to presume a lost grant. And they
"were directed so to find in cases in which no one had the
faintest belief that any grant had ever existed, and where the
presumption was known to be a mere fiction."' eg
Such instructions are given, said Wilde, J.,170
"not . . . because either the court or jury believes the
presumed grant to have been actually made, but because public
policy and convenience require that long continued possession
shall not be disturbed."' '
Next, the question arose whether the presumption could be
displaced by showing that no grant was in fact made. Upon this ques-
tion there is not unanimity. Conflicting views were expressed by
14 Washburn, Easements (4th ed.) 125. See Lord Blackburn, in Dalton v.
Angus (1881), L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 812.
205 Washburn, op. cit. 126.1 See early cases collected in note to Yard v. Ford in 2 Williams' Saunders
(ed. 1845) 175. See especially Lord Mansfield, C. J., in Mayor of Hull v. Horner(1774r Cowper, 102,108, 109.2 Bowen, J., in Dalton '. Angus (1881) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 781, 782-783.
1GS 11 Halsbury s 529.
leo Cockburn, .J., in Angus v. Dalton (1877) L. R. 3 Q. B. 85, 105.
170 (1829) 8 Pick. 504. 508-509.
¢tI In an article on Legal Fictions: The Case of Angus v. Dalton, 4 Law
Mag. and Rev. (4th Ser., 1879) 281, 284, Sir Win. Markby says:
"Thc grand error . . is making the existence or non-existence of this
fictitious grant part of the question to be submitted to the jury. Submit what?
The truth of a fiction?"
In Angus v. Dalton (1877) L. R. 3 Q. B. 85, 94, Lush, J., speaks of "the
revolting fition of a lost grant." In the First Report of the English Commis-
sioners on the Law of Real Property, the learned Commissioners call it "the
clumsy fiction of a lost grant," and say that it is "well known to counsel, judge,
and jury that the plea is unfounded in fact."
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various judges in the leading case of Dalton v. Angus."ra But we
think that the weight of authority, both in England and America, is
opposed to the admissibility of direct evidence to show that no grant
was ever made.1 73
The practical result is that, in place of what was originally a
presumption of fact, the courts have substituted a positive rule of
law. Where a result was originally alleged to be founded on a pre-
sumption, the courts have discarded the presumption, and have estab-
lished a positive rule of law not based on the presumption, but giving
the same results. In effect,
"prescription has been advanced from the law of evidence to a
place in the substantive law.' 74
"The familiar doctrine about prescription used to be put
as an ordinary rule of presumption; in twenty years there arose
a prima facie case of a lost grant or of some other legal origin.
The judges at first laid it down that, if unanswered, twenty
years of adverse possession justified the inference; then that it
'required the inference,' i. e., it was the jury's duty to do what
they themselves would do in settling the same question, namely,
to find the fact of the lost grant; and at last this conclusion
was announced as a rule of the law of property, to be applied
,absolutely."'75
In Dalton v. Angus,176 Lindley, J., said:
"The theory of an implied grant was invented as a means
to an end. It afforded a technical common-law reason for not
disturbing a long continued open enjoyment. But it appears to
me contrary to the reason for the theory itself to allow such
an enjoyment to be disturbed simply because it can be proved
that no grant was ever in fact made. If any lawful origin for
such an enjoyment can be suggested, the presumption in favor
of its legality ought to be made. . . The theory of an
implied grant as distinguished from a legal presumption of
172 (1881) L. R 6 App. Cas. 740.
173" . . the presumption cannot be displaced by merely showing that no
grant was in fact made; the long enjoyment either estops the servient owner
from relying on such evidence or overrides it when given." Gale, Easements
(9th ed.) 192. But, compare Goddard, Easements (7th ed.) 174.
English writers who seem inclined to adopt the view taken in Gale on Ease-
ments, state it cautiously. Thus, in Jenks' Digest of English Civil Law, Book 3,
"Property," s. 1439: "(Probably) direct evidence may not be adduced to show
that no grant . . . was in fact made." And in 11 Halsbury, s. 531: "Direct
evidence that the grant was never made would appear to be inadmissible to rebut
the presumption of a lost modem grant raised by the uninterrupted user."
As to American authorities: see 14 Cyc. 1146-1147. And compare 2 Chain-
berlayne, Mod.' Law of Evid., ss. 1163a, 1163b. See also Wallace v. Fletcher(1855) 30 N. H. 434.
174 Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 533.
175J. B. Thayer, Prel. Treatise on Evid. 317. Compare Bell, J., in Wallace v.
Fletcher (1855) 30 N. H., 434, 447-8, 452.
176 (1881) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 765.
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some lawful origin is in my opinion, untenable and practically
misleading. ,u'1
In Markby, Elements of Law,178 the learned author says:
'I do not think that the English law of prescription will
ever be put upon a satisfactory footing until the notion is got
rid of that all prescription presumes a grant, and until pre-
scription is recognized here, as on the continent of Europe, as
a means of acquiring ownership. The grant is only a fiction,
and the fiction here is not a useful one. It does not indicate
the principles to be applied."
JEREMIAH SMITH
(Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, January, 1918.)
'T In Goddard, Easements (7th ed.) 180 it is said, in reference to the
opinion of Lindley, J., in Angus v. Dalton:-
" , . his opinion is of importance, as he expressed a view that goes to the
root of the whole theory of presumption of grant and tends to its destruction."
178 (3d ed.) s. 588.
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SLACKER!1
Thousands of you who read this page have been filled
with loathing and contempt for those shirkers and cowards
to whom we apply the epithet, "SLACKER."
But there are others, in addition to those who are too
cowardly to shoulder a gun, to whom that term of black
disgrace applies.
Any man or woman in your town, who does not take all
the Liberty Bonds that he or she possibly can buy, is in e.vactly
the same class with those wretched creatures of feeble brain
and feeble spine, those cowards we call "SLACKERS."
Such a man or woman isn't worthy to blacken the shoes
of an American soldier who goes across to give his life on the
blood-soaked soil of France.
Such men and women, no matter whether they live in
cottages or mansions, are not fit to associate with REAL
AMERICANS. Such men and women are not fit to live in
this community, or anywhere else in America. They are not
fit to live at all.
For such men and women are perfectly satisfied to con-
tinue their selfish pleasures and go along in their selfish, nar-
row ruts, while the best young men in America go across the
sea to place their bodies as a barrier of human flesh and blood
between us and our enemies.
Such men and women are yellow to the core. By neg-
lecting to take all the Liberty Bonds they can, they're helping
the Kaiser, they're making the war last longer, they're helping
to drive cold bayonet steel into American soldiers' breasts.
If you can't pay cash for your bonds, you can borrow
a part of the money at your bank, using the bonds as security,
or, you can buy them at your bank on easy partial payment
plan. It is no trouble to buy Liberty Bonds-it is no trouble
to pay for them. See your banker today.
(This advertisement is donated by the Editors of the
ST. Louis LAW Rvxmw as part of their contribution toward
winning the war.)
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